Three Topics

- Motivating Functionalism
- Two Types of Qualia Trouble
- A Functionalist Response
Motivating Functionalism

- Born of Failure
- To Wit, the failures of:
  - Analytical Behaviourism
  - Type-Type Identity Theory
- Motivated by a Flight from Dualism
Type-Type Identity Theory

- In its purest form, TTI holds that every mental property is identical with some single non-disjunctive physical property.
- Thus, the property of being in pain is identical with the property of being neural state $N^{237}$.
- Founders on the multiple realizability of the mental.
  - Possibly, something is in pain though it is not in neural state $N^{237}$.
  - Disjunctive properties do not come to the rescue.
The Causal Theory of Mind

- Behaviourism, though discredited, is not disgraced: minds are causal engines.
- Mental states are apt to stand in causal relations:
  - Indeed, mental states are essentially relational.
  - Being a belief is rather like being a sibling: while every sibling is token identical to some person or other, the property being a sibling is essentially relational.
  - Or, better, consider being poison: every poison is some stuff or other, but poison is multiply realizable.
Machine Functionalism

- being a soda dispenser

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Input: 50p</td>
<td>No output:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Go to S2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Output:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One Soda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Go to S1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input: £1</th>
<th>Output:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One soda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Go to S1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output:</th>
<th>One Soda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>and 50p</td>
<td>Go to S1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three Worries

❖ Profligacy
❖ Inverted qualia
❖ Absent Qualia

❖ The general structure of all such worries:

1. Possibly $S^1$ and $S^2$ are functional isomorphs, but in qualitatively distinct states.

2. If $S^1$ and $S^2$ are in qualitatively distinct states, then $S^1$ and $S^2$ are not in the same mental states.

3. If $S^1$ and $S^2$ are in the same functional states but not the same mental states, then functionalism fails.

4. Hence, functionalism fails.
Profligacy

❖ Evidently, the people of Brazil could realize the machine table for being a soda dispenser:

❖ If they could also realize a more complex functional definition, then they (the 187, 866, 761 Brazilians) could have a single mental state.

❖ But they cannot

❖ A small colony of *homunculi* could inhabit Chancellor Merkel’s head.

❖ Presumably, they too could realize that same machine table, in which case they would have a single mental state.

❖ But they cannot.
They cannot?

- We expect conscious beings to:
  - be integrated subjects of awareness.
  - to have delimited points of view.
  - to be perspectival.
  - to be in states with qualitative character.
Qualitative Character

❖ Best—and perhaps only—known by ostension.
❖ These are the phenomenal or experiential features of our mental lives.
❖ The qualitative character of some state S is *what it is like to be in S.*
❖ We may think of qualia locally, as pertaining primarily to individual states:
  ❖ the taste of a ripe peach, the feel of cool, smooth marble, and so forth
  ❖ The feeling of joy, surprise, longing, disgust, desire
  ❖ The affective structure of some cognitive states (?)
Functional Definitions and Qualia

❖ Consider two features of pain

❖ Functional: Pain is that state which is characteristically caused by tissue damage and which, together with other mental states, tends to give rise to wincing, groaning, and flight behaviour.

❖ Phenomenal: Pain is that state which hurts.

❖ If the first is essential and the second is not, then functional definitions are adequate; if the second is essential and the first not, then phenomenal definitions are adequate.

❖ If both are essential, then we can expect reduction in neither direction.
Two Problems for Functional Definitions

❖ Inverted qualia are possible: functional isomorphs might be qualitatively inverted.

❖ Absent qualia: Functional isomorphs might be such that one has qualia and the other lacks them altogether. (This is the zombie hypothesis.)
The problem of inverted qualia:

1. Possibly $S^1$ and $S^2$ are functional isomorphs, while $S^1$ is in $QS^2$ while $S^2$ is in $QS^1$ (where $QS^1$ and $QS^2$ systematically flip with one another—say red qualia for green qualia).

2. If (1), then Functionalism fails.

3. Hence, Functionalism fails.

N.b.: it will not suffice at this juncture to appeal to the supervenience of the mental on the physical
The problem of absent qualia:

1. Possibly, $S^1$ and $S^2$ are functional isomorphs, while $S^1$ is in some qualitative state while $S^2$ is in none.

2. If (1), then Functionalism fails.

3. Hence, Functionalism fails.
Zombies cannot be:

1. Pain is *inter alia* a qualitative state.

2. Necessarily, if x is a qualitative state, then there will be associated with x a range of beliefs whose contents will include x. (Call such beliefs "qualitative beliefs," that is, beliefs about qualitative states.)

3. Hence, associated with every instance of pain will be a qualitative belief.

4. Pains are individuated in part by reference to the associated mental states to which they give rise.

5. If (4), then nothing is in pain unless it has the appropriate relations to its associated qualitative beliefs.

6. Hence, nothing is in pain unless it has the appropriate relations to pain’s associated qualitative beliefs.

7. Absent qualia are possible only if it is possible for something to be in pain without having pain’s associated qualitative beliefs.

8. Hence, absent qualia are impossible.
Pulling Back: A Diagnosis

❖ All of Functionalism’s problems stem from a common source, namely, the suggestion that mental states are exhausted by their relationality.

❖ It is crucial to get the metaphysics of types right: not every causally-indicated type is a causal type.