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## Descartes' Dualism

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1. I can doubt that my body exists. (That is, more clumsily: my body has the property of being able to be doubted by me as to whether it exists.)
2. I cannot doubt that I exist. (That is, again more clumsily: I lack the property of being able to be doubted by me as to whether I exist.)
3. LL
4. So, I am not identical with my body.

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# Certainty

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1. I may be certain of my own experiences, when I have them. (For example, I may be certain that I am in pain, when I am in pain.)
2. I cannot be certain of my own physical states, including my own brain and neuro-physiological states. (Indeed, humans knew they were in pain long before anyone had every heard of a neuro-physiological state.)
3. LL
4. So, my experiences are not physical states of any kind.
  - ❖ That is, to put it clumsily: my mental states have the feature of *being known with certainty by me that they exist*, whereas my brain and neurophysiological states lack this feature.

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## A Modal Cartesian Version

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1. It is possible that my body does not exist. (I can imagine that my body does not exist; there is at any rate no contradiction in my doing so.)
2. It is not possible that I do not exist. (I cannot imagine that I do not exist; there is something self-undermining about the proposition 'I do not exist.')
3. LL
4. So, I am not identical to my body.

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## Gertler's Argument for Dualism (Simple Version)

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- (1) If being in pain is identical with (say) being neural state  $n^{237}$ , then necessarily (pain =  $n^{237}$ ).
- (2) Possibly (pain  $\neq n^{237}$ ).
- (3) So, pain  $\neq n^{237}$ .

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## Gertler's Argument (Slightly More Complicated Version)

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- (1) I can conceive of being in pain while being disembodied.
- (2) If I can conceive of  $p$ , then  $p$  is possible.
- (3) So, it is possible that I might be in pain while being disembodied.
- (4) If being in pain is identical with some physical state or other—e.g. if (pain =  $n^{237}$ )—then it is not possible that I might be in pain while being disembodied.
- (5) So, pain is not identical with any physical state.
- (6) If (5), then dualism is true.
- (7) So, dualism is true.

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## So, then, why not dualism?

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- ❖ On the hypothesis of (substance) dualism, a soul / mind is an immaterial entity, and thus has:
  - ❖ no location
  - ❖ no mass
  - ❖ no energy
  - ❖ and so, evidently, no causal power
- ❖ So, if there were immaterial souls / minds, they would be causally inert

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# The Ghost in the Machine

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- ❖ Datum: mental and physical states causally interact, in two directions.
  - ❖ Bodily events cause mental events.
  - ❖ Mental events cause bodily events.
- ❖ This yields a short, but formidable argument:
  - (1) Dualism is true only if souls and bodies causally interact.
  - (2) Immaterial substances (if there are any) are causally inert.
  - (3) So, if souls are immaterial substances, they are causally inert.
  - (4) If souls are causally inert, they cannot causally interact with bodies.
  - (5) So, dualism is false.



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# Some Terms

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- ❖ Let *reductive physicalism* be the thesis that mental events exist, but are identical with first-order physical events (presumably events in the brain and neural system).
  - ❖ Mental events are like lightning and water. There is lightning: lightning is identical with such-and-such a discharge of electricity. There is water: water is identical with H<sub>2</sub>O.
  - ❖ The IT is a form of reductive physicalism
- ❖ Let *non-reductive physicalism* be the thesis that mental events exist, but cannot be *identified* with first-order physical events.
  - ❖ One possibility: mental events are not strictly in their own natures physical, but they are (and perhaps can only be) realized in physical systems. Mental states are like algorithms or functions.
- ❖ Let *eliminativism* be the thesis that there are no mental events.
  - ❖ There seem to be mental events, but in fact there are none.
    - ❖ Mental events are like witches. Witches are not, as it happens, women who suffer from epilepsy. Rather, *there are no witches*. People who thought otherwise were simply wrong.



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## Mary, the Colour Scientist

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- ❖ Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'... What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false.—Jackson (1982)

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# The Knowledge Argument 1

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1. Mary knows everything physical there is to know about colour.
2. If, when she steps out of the room, she learns something new about redness, then there is something to know about redness beyond the physical.
3. If there is something to know about redness beyond the physical, then physicalism is false.
4. Mary does learn something new about redness when she steps out of the room.
5. Hence, physicalism is false.

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## The Knowledge Argument 2

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1. Mary knows all of the physical facts about redness, but none the less learns some new facts upon first perceiving redness directly.
2. If (1), then there must be some non-physical facts—viz. facts pertaining to *qualia*.
3. So, there are some non-physical facts—viz. facts pertaining to *qualia*.
4. If (3), then physicalism is false.
5. So, physicalism is false.

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# Generalized

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1. If physicalism is true, then all of reality can be characterized in objective terms.
2. There are (or seem to be) subjective facts, including perspectival and experiential facts.
3. So, if physicalism is true, either (i) these (seemingly) subjective facts can be reduced to physical facts, or (ii) these seemingly subjective facts are not facts at all. [This is to say either: (i) reductivism or (ii) eliminativism.]
4. Subjective facts cannot be reduced to physical facts.
5. Subjective facts cannot be eliminated.
6. So, physicalism is false.

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# Doleful Angels?

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Angel of Grief  
William Wetmore Story

At once as far as Angels kenn he views  
The dismal Situation waste and wilde,  
A Dungeon horrible, on all sides round  
As one great Furnace flam'd, yet from those  
flames  
No light, but rather darkness visible  
Serv'd onely to discover sights of woe,  
Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where  
peace  
And rest can never dwell, hope never comes  
That comes to all; but torture without end  
Still urges, and a fiery Deluge, fed  
With ever-burning Sulphur unconsum'd  
Milton, *Paradise Lost* i 59-69

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# Revisiting the Mind-Brain Identity Theory

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- ❖ In its purest form, the reductive MBI holds that every mental property is *identical* with some single physical property (Type-Type Identity Theory—TTIT).
  - ❖ Thus, the property of being in pain is identical with the property of being neural state  $n^{237}$ .
  - ❖ Or the property of being a belief that Vienna is the most beautiful city in Europe is identical with the property of being neural state  $n^{2549}$ .
- ❖ This theory evidently founders on the multiple realizability (MR) of the mental:
  - ❖ Possibly, something is in pain though it is not in neural state  $n^{237}$ .