Metaphysics 2019 Reading Schedule 


(LCR) = Loux, Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings


Week One: Theseus’ Ship Sails Again


Weeks Two-Three: Universals 

  • Week Two: Realism about Universals 
    • Loux, ‘The Problem of Universals’  (LCR)
    • Russell, ‘The World of Universals’ (LCR)
    • Price, ‘Universals and Resemblances’ (LCR)
    • Armstrong, ‘Universals as Attributes’ (LCR)
  • Week Three: Nominalism
    • Quine, ‘On What There Is’ (LCR)
    • Williams, ‘The Elements of Being’ (LCR)


Weeks Four-Six: Particulars

  • Week Four: Particulars and Predication 
    • Loux, ‘The Ontological Structure of Concrete Particulars’ (LCR)
    • Black, ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’ (LCR)
    • Allaire, ‘Bare Particulars’ (LCR)
  • Week Five: Bundles
    • Van Cleve, ‘Three Versions of the Bundle Theory’
    • Casullo, ‘A Fourth Version of the Bundle Theory'
  • Week Six: Particular Substances
    • Van Cleve, 'The Moon and Sixpence,' in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, ed. Hawthorne, T. Sider, and D. Zimmerman (Blackwell, 2008), 321-40.
    • Wolterstorff, ‘Bergmann’s Constituent Ontology,’ Nous 4 (1970), 109-134
    • Loux, ‘What is Constituent Ontology?’ in L. Novak et al. edd., Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic, 43-57


Weeks Seven-Eight: Modality and Possible Worlds 

  • Week Seven: Possible Worlds 
    • Loux, ‘Modality and Possible Worlds’ (LCR)
    • Lewis, ‘Possible Worlds’ (LCR)
  • Week Eight: Actualism
    • Plantinga, ‘Actualism and Possible Worlds’ (LCR)
    • Lewis, ‘Counterparts or Double Lives’ (LCR)
    • Kripke, ‘Identity and Necessity’ (LCR)


Week Nine: Mid-semester Break


Weeks Ten: Causation 

  • Week Ten: Causes and Causings
    • Hume, ‘Selections from A Treatise on Human Nature’ (LCR)
    • Ewing, ‘Cause’ (LCR)
    • Anscombe, ‘Causality and Determination’ (LCR)
    • Lewis, ‘Causation’ (LCR)


Weeks Eleven-Fourteen: Time and Persistence 

  • Week Eleven: Time 
    • Loux, ‘Time: The A-Theory and the B-Theory’ (LCR)
    • McTaggart, ‘Time’ (LCR)
    • Broad, ‘Ostensible Temporality’ (LCR)
    • Prior, ‘The Notion of the Present’ (LCR)
    • Mellor, ‘The Need for Tense’ (LCR)
  • Week Twelve: Persistence 
    • Heller, ‘Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects’ (LCR)
    • Merricks, ‘Endurance and Indiscernibility’ (LCR)
  • Week Thirteen: Persistence through Time 
    • Parfit, ‘Survival and Identity’  (LCR)
  • Week Fourteen: Substance and Life
    • Shields, “The Dialectic of Life,” Synthese 185 (2012), 103-124 


Week Fifteen-Sixteen: Realism and Anti-Realism

  • Week Fifteen An Anti-Realist Challenge, a Response 
    • Dummet, ‘Realism’
    • Quine, ‘Ontological Relativity’
    • Van Inwagen, ‘Objectivity'
  •  Week Sixteen: Quodlibetal 
© Christopher Shields 2014